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Introduction:
In 1988 PG Bison, South Africa's leading particle board manufacturer, initiated a multi-
faceted change process which was intended to reposition the company in anticipation of the
advent of political democracy and the re-integration of the South African economy into a
highly competitive global economy. Their "continuous improvement" process, nicknamed
Total Productivity and Quality (TPQ) involved the establishment of, among others,
participative processes, company values and work teams called "in-a-groups". Through
these initiatives the company was hoping to elicit the workers' voluntary co-operation and
involvement in performance enhancing activities.
In 1991 Nampak Polyfoil, a Johannesburg-based factory owned by printing and packaging
group Nampak Limited initiated a similar, but less ambitious, initiative which was called
"the change process" which also promised workers greater participation in decision-
making.
The study, which was conducted at the Piet Retief plant of PG Bison and at Nampak
Polyfoil, aimed at examining the responses of the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied
Workers' Union (PPWAWU)2 to these managerial strategies. Material for the sudy was
gathered through in-depth interviews with shop stewards, managers and union officials. In
addition, 31 Nampak Polyfoil workers and 41 at PG Bison were surveyed to get their views
on a variety of subjects related to the topic.
The study found differences between the way the national union, on the one hand, and
shopfloor workers and their shop stewards, on the other, responded to these strategies.
This paper discusses the responses of unionised workers and concludes that workers are not
merely passive objects to be manipulated by national union leaders as Michels (1959) has
suggested. On the contrary, unionised workers have an interest in union policy-making,
particularly on issues which affect them directly on the shopfloor. The research showed
that union decision-making on shopfloor issues is always a contested issue between the
national leadership on the one hand, and unionised workers, on the other. In the case of PG
Bison, union members went to the extent of defying a national union decision not to get
involved in the management-initiated change programme. (Buhlungu, 1996: 148)
But the workers' intervention in union policy-making was not confined to defiance of the
national leadership. As this paper will show, workers and their shop stewards went further
to debate an alternative vision of the workplace which was based on their notions of
democracy, fairness and justice.
For many workers, particularly those organised under the the post-1973 unions, workplace
democratisation was not only about idealised notions of participation in decision-making at
work. It was also about practical steps to dismantle what Von Holdt (forthcoming) has
termed "apartheid workplace regimes", workplace social structures which "allocated rights
and resources unequally among differently socialised actors" (forthcoming: 201)
The growth of monopoly capitalism in South Africa in the 1950s and the 1960s had created
the material conditions for the development of militant unionism which was rooted on the
shopfloor. By the mid-1970s the struggles waged by black workers on the shopfloor had
shifted the balance of forces and made unionism a "permanent feature of industry".
(Webster, 1985: 150) Since the mid-1980s the struggles of the independent unions have
consolidated and deepened organisation on the shop floor. Not only were these struggles
about improving wages and working conditions, but in some cases, the struggles began to
pose questions about control of the workplaces, or what Goodrich (1920) has termed
'interfering with the employer's business1. (1920: 54 - 6) Such was the confidence of the
independent unions that at its inaugural congress in 1985 the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) called for "workers control and management of production".
(COSATU, 1985)
Debates within the labour movement, particularly in COSATU, have always tried to
establish a link between the what has been termed "worker control and management of
production1 and the struggle for socialism. These debates have tended to see the
achievement of worker control of production as the next phase of the trade union struggle
at the workplace. As Elijah Barayi, former president of COSATU put it,
The workers' struggle for socialism has already begun. Finally socialism means
workers having control over their own lives. To control our own lives, workers
need to control everything that affects our lives. This struggle for control is going
on all the time. It is one of the principles of COSATU and is something we fight to
deepen and extend every day. Whether it is the mineworkers bringing their wives to
the hostels or SAB workers striking because bosses are making a unilateral decision
or workers fighting to throw out a rotten leadership in their union or the working
class involved in building democratic community structures or whatever - it is all
about control. And socialism is about workers controlling. (COSATU, 1987: 6)
But South African trade unions have so far failed to develop a coherent strategy for worker
control or workplace democracy, with the result that unions have lost the initiative to
management. (Buhlungu, 1996; Barret, 1993) PPWAWU officials acknowledged that the
union had no policy on workplace democratisation and that instead the union tended to
react to managerial strategies and initiatives. These responses are ad hoc and defensive in
nature and emanate from fears that such managerial strategies hold the danger of
dampening worker militancy and co-opting the unions' membership.
In contrast to the defensiveness of the national union, shopfloor workers and shop stewards
have been engaging with the new managerial initiatives through discussions and
participation in worker-management structures set up for that purpose. What this
engagement indicates is not whether or not workers face co-option by management. Rather
it is consistent with the workers' experience of struggle in a capitalist workplace, namely,
that they have to work within the system in order to understand it and to oppose it
effectively when they are unable to win meaningful gains. But most importantly, workers'
experience of the capitalist labour process is always contradictory and always involves
'working the system'. Although they oppose the capitalism's dehumanising and exploitative
aspects, workers also find that they have to co-operate with capital at the point of
production.
Thus engagement was the only way workers could understand the opportunities and
limitations of management's initiatives. In the course of such engagement workers were
able to develop a critique of the initiatives and debate an alternative vision of workplace
democratisation. Although these debates have not resulted in a concrete strategy, this study
found elements of a workers' vision of workplace democratisation which could lay the
foundations for a union-wide strategy.
The significance of the workers' vision is fourfold. Firstly, it goes beyond process issues
and begins to raise questions and make practical suggestions on the content of workplace
democratisation. They are also debating and defining what meaningful participation is,
what issues to participate in, etc. The research established that the workers' notion of
participation is very different from that of management.
Secondly, the vision points to the beginning of a new phase of struggle for the union
movement where workers attempt to influence and change power relations on the shopfloor
by focusing on concrete issues and problems over and above wages and conditions of
employment.
Thirdly, it shows the extent to which debate among workers themselves has deepened on
the issue of control and democracy in the workplace. There is an awareness among workers
that they can and should use the power they have acquired in struggles over the years to
demand a greater say in decision-making in their companies.
Fourthly, it challenges the notion that workers cannot engage in strategic debates and union
policy-making, particularly on issues which affect them directly at the point of production.
This contradicts Michels' (1959) notion of an "iron law of oligarchy" which is born of the
general apathy, ignorance and lack of skills among the rank-and-file and the skills and
greed for power of full-time officials. (1959: 205) The workers interest in decision-making
on shopfloor issues confirms Lane's (1974) observation that although the union and the
rank-and-file have an identical concern in wanting to maximise the price of labour power
and the conditions under which it is used, the union's concern tends to be at the level of
abstraction whereas workers tend to be concerned with the generalities as well as the finer
details of how their labour power is utilised. (1974: 189) Lane goes further to argue that:
The union's general concern with price entailed treating labour power in the
abstract. The rank and file's additional concern with particularities - because it,
rather than the union, was the embodiment of labour power - meant that its
disposal, far from being abstract, was an intimate part of its life experience. The
upshot of this discrepancy was that the range of what the rank and file considered
legitimate was wider than the range considered legitimate by the union. For the
union, wage issues were eminently legitimate because they lent themselves to
negotiations in abstract arithmetical terms. Issues related to managerial authority
could not be reduced to pounds and pence and tended therefore not to be
negotiated. (1974: 189)
It is is this concern with particularities which explains the interest shown by rank and file
workers in the politics of workplace democratisation. Theories of bureaucracy and
oligarchy fail to take account of this point are are therefore not useful for understanding
union engagement in production politics because they underestimate the rank-and-file's
interest and capacity to engage in strategic debates on these issues.
The Politics of Workplace Democracy: Voices from the shopfloor
It is important to begin by situating the discussion in the context of capitalist production
where relations between workers and capitalists are unequal. Management, as agents of the
owners of capital, have the right to plan, direct and control production while workers have
to do the actual work of producing goods by combining their labour power with other
forces of production. In this case their labour becomes a commodity bought by the
capitalist to be used in a way the capitalist sees fit. It is here that Edwards (1979), in his
discussion of co-ordination and control in different forms of social production, locates the
question of control and participation in decision-making in capitalist production:
(T)here is a presumption, indeed a contractual right backed by legal force, for the
capitalist, as owner of the purchased labor power, to direct its use. A corollary
presumption (again backed by legal force) follows: that the workers whose labor
power has been purchased have no right to participate in the conception and
planning of production. Coordination occurs in capitalist production as it must
inevitably occur in all social production, but it takes the form of top-down
coordination, for the exercise of which the top (capitalists) must be able to control
the bottom (workers). In analysing capitalist production, then, it is more appropriate
to speak of control than coordination, although of course, control is a means of
coordination. (Edwards, 1979: 17)
The question of worker participation and industrial democracy therefore centres around
whether or not workers should have the right to 'participate in the conception and planning
of production'. It is generally acknowledged in all the literature that worker participation or
industrial democracy or workers1 control of industry is a matter that goes beyond what
Clegg (1960) calls 'pressure group industrial democracy' or 'democracy through collective
bargaining'. (1960: 131) Debates on worker participation and industrial democracy are
concerned about challenging or posing questions about management's right to manage or
the so-called prerogative to control and run production. (Goodrich, 1920; Mailer, 1992)
Clegg identifies two schools of thought in the debate on industrial democracy, namely, the
reformists and the revolutionaries. According to this characterisation the reformists argue
that industrial democracy could be achieved through various forms of worker participation
schemes in management, while revolutionaries believe true industrial democracy can only
be achieved once capitalism has been destroyed and replaced by a system of worker self-
government. (Clegg, 1960: 131-2) But in practice issues are not as clear-cut as the above
characterisation seems to suggest. In the past debates in COSATU tended towards a
position which saw industrial democracy as an incremental process which was an outcome
of ongoing struggles in the workplace. However, there was the notion that an ideal form of
industrial democracy could only be achieved under socialism.
While the collapse of East European socialism has dampened the enthusiasm of some in the
leadership of the labour movement for the idea, South African workers continue to pose
questions around the issue of control in an attempt to push back the frontier of control. The
democratisation of national politics has given further impetus to these debates among shop
floor workers. As one Nampak Poly foil shop steward put it,
I'm committed to change because the whole South Africa is changing. Why
must we stay like this? (Irene Lazarus, shop steward, Nampak Polyfoif)
An important feature of both factories covered in this study is that they, like most South
African factories, have a history of an autocratic management style and racism. The
workers and shop stewards interviewed recalled a history a racism, unfair dismissals,
harassment and poor wages and working conditions. All of them said they joined the union
to fight or to correct one or all these problems. As one Nampak Polyfoil worker explained,
I joined the union because management was harassing us. So I joined for security
and protection. I also wanted to join other workers to fight apartheid at this factory.
(Worker No. 26, Nampak Polyfoil)
In both factories management introduced their experiments in worker participation in a
context where the union had won a lot of power for its members, thus earning it a great
deal of legitimacy and loyalty among the workers. Even at PG Bison where union
shopfloor structures were relatively weak the union still had the ability to challenge
management and represent workers effectively on a number of issues, like wages,
conditions of employment and grievances and disciplinary cases. Where shopfloor
structures were ineffective workers could still rely on union branch and national structures
to intervene on their behalf. This legitimacy and power of the union derived from the
union's effective representation of workers' interests as well as well as the democratic
character of union governance and decision-making. By contrast, workers believed that
management could not be trusted to represent or promote their interests. In the eyes of
many workers management was the oppressor and exploiter. The chairperson of the
Nampak Polyfoil shop stewards committee was not exaggerating in his comments about the
union's credibility among the workers when he asserted:
I am confident that workers listen to us and they respect us more than they would
listen to whatever management will say. We believe that we do have a direct
influence with the workers, and not actually in terms of dictating to them, but if we
show them things from our own point of view. (Zimi Masuku, shop stewards'
chairperson, Nampak Polyfoil)
A PG Bison worker expressed the same sentiment in different words:
My view is that management started TPQ because they saw that they were losing
power. So they thought TPQ would satisfy the demands of the workers and stop
them from demanding more power. (Worker No. 25, PG Bison)
But in both cases this power by the workers and their union did not constitute a threat to
management's right to manage or control production. Why then, did management introduce
worker participation? Cressey, Eldridge and Maclnnes (1985) give an explanation which
has relevance for understanding why management in South Africa are introducing worker
participation. In their research in six British factories from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s
they found that management had opted for a new strategy because of 'instability, change
and turbulence1 which was evident in these factories. Such instability and turbulence, they
argued, promotes challenges to normal management policies and practices, thus forcing
capital to look for new strategies. The objective of such new strategies is to find a 'working
consensus' and gain legitimacy for their authority because when management ceases to
manage through consensus and legitimate authority the instability becomes a crisis.
(Cressey, Eldridge and Maclnnes, 1985: 143)
While the conditions and some of the crises faced by Nampak and PG Bison management
may differ from the 'models of crises' identified by Cressey et al in their study of British
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industry, South African industry has been experiencing instability, change and turbulence
for a number of years now. (Von Holdt, 1993: 52) Thus it is possible to arrive at a similar
conclusion that Nampak Polyfoil, PG Bison and indeed, all South African companies that
have embraced worker participation and similar schemes conceive of these as as political
strategies to 'gain a working consensus1 on the shop floor and reproduce managerial
control.
A number of possible reasons why management introduced worker participation were
included in a questionnaire for workers and in each case workers were given the option to
'agree', 'disagree' or indicate if they were 'not sure'. Table 1 below looks at responses to
these and the results clearly indicate that most workers remain suspicious of management's
intentions and believe that management is simply trying to win their co-operation in an
effort to improve productivity without really giving workers anything meaningful in return.
The results also point to a very strong fear that management is trying to weaken or
undermine the union.3
The findings are particularly pertinent here as they illustrate not only the factors which led
to the disillusionment of the workers, but they also highlight important issues related to the
concerns and aspirations of workers on the shopfloor.
Table 1: Why did management introduce worker participation?:
1. "Management is sincere about involving workers in decision-making"
Factory (sample) Agree (%) Not Sure (%\ Disagree (%)
PG Bison (41) 27.5 - 72.5
NP Polyfoil (31) 38.7 6.5 54.8
2. "They want to divide and weaken the union"
PG Bison (41) 72.5 7.5 20
NP Polyfoil (31) 48.4 16.1 35.5
3. "They just want workers to increase productivity"
PG Bison (41) 95 2.5 2.5
NP Polyfoil (31) 90.3 3.2 6.5
4. "They want workers to be loyal to the company "
PG Bison (41) 92.5 2.5 5
NP Polyfoil (31) 93.5 - 6.5
5. "Management has not really changed. This is just one of their tricks to co-opt workers"
PG Bison (41) 90 2.5 7.5
NP Polyfoil (31) 71 12.9 16.1
It will be noted from this table that the responses of the workers are, with a few exceptions
at Nampak Polyfoil, generally negative. They also suggest that workers were suspicious of
management's intentions. This suspicion appears to arise from the from their experience of
what they regard as management's lack of good faith and unwillingness to relinquish their
control on the shopfloor. As one Nampak Polyfoil shop steward put it,
(T)here is fear from management that we as workers want to take control of the
running of the factory. Also, on our side, we were suspicious that whatever white
people may say, they are still white people and they are oppressors and there will
be a motive behind what they are saying to us. At that time we took decisions on
issues that needed to be done practically. But what we saw was that in most cases
management was making fools of us. They would say, 'yes, we will do this1, but at
the end of the day when they were supposed to take practical action we would find
that they were not abiding by decisions. (Sydwell Qomoyi, shop steward, Nampak
Polyfoil)
Yet Nampak Polyfoil workers believed that, through the use of power, they could make
some gains by engaging in the process irrespective of managements' agenda. This probably
comes from the workers' experience of the independent union movement's tradition of
engaging management, when the balance of power is favourable, in order to win
incremental gains, and blocking management programmes when the balance of power is not
favourable. This would seem to suggest that workers on the shopfloor make conscious
choices on whether to engage or to embark on militant abstentionism. In other words,
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militant abstentionism was never conceived of as an approach appropriate for all situations,
nor was engagement regarded as a universally undesirable strategy. A more plausible
explanation it that the tradition of shopfloor unionism, of which PPWAWU members are
part, has taught workers to embark on either of these strategies after carefully considering
the costs and benefits of each strategy as well as the balance of power in the relationship
between capital and labour. The difference between the two factories seems to indicate that
where workers have power and believe that the balance of power is in their favour, they
tend to favour a strategy of engagement. This becomes clear in the case of Nampak
Polyfoil where, according to a shop steward, management approached the workers again in
1993 suggesting that the change process be revived. The workers agreed to become
involved in the process once again in order to test it. The shop steward says the workers
said,
'(W)e will see what management's aims concerning this thing, whether they want to
use us as slaves to jack up their production. Then if that is the case they will be
surprised to see what will happen because everything can just come to a standstill1.
And they have also said, 'it is never too late to take a step back'. (Zimi Masuku,
shop steward, Nampak Polyfoil)
On the other hand, where workers do not have power and do not believe that the balance of
power is in their favour, the preference for militant abstentionism tends to be greater than
for engagement. PG Bison's situation after the suspension of TPQ is a typical example of
this scenario.
A Different Vision:
Workers' and shop stewards' notion of what worker participation or industrial democracy
is, or should be, had as its starting point a critique of what management was trying to do.
In both cases management's initial offer to allow worker participation raised excitement
and expectations among many workers because management promised to bring about many
changes on the shop floor and in the way the companies were run. According to Sipho
Kubheka, a former general secretary of the union, these were long-standing demands by the
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workers. He argues that because the unions had failed to prepare a clear programme of
action on worker participation and control, management then took these demands and
turned them into "weapons of management, to further deepen their controlling process".4
At PG Bison TPQ promised to end racial discrimination, to guarantee life-long
employment, participation in decision-making structures right up to the board of directors,
incentive bonus schemes, and a greater say for workers around their specific jobs. But
when the process failed to produce results workers became critical and in both factories this
led them to withdraw their support. At PG Bison the workers waited for three years to see
results but none of the promises materialised. Instead new practices, like 'multi-skilling',
which were not acceptable to workers were introduced, and shop stewards became
alienated from the workers. As one PG Bison worker commented later,
When TPQ came it sounded very good. We thought that it would bring us many
good things. But now it is clear that we cannot get any good from TPQ. {Worker
No. IS, PG Bison)
A similar situation occurred at Nampak Polyfoil when the change process failed to translate
into real benefits for the workers. Workers began to feel that the change process was a
strategy by management to adapt to changing circumstances, nationally and internationally,
rather than a sincere attempt to concede some of their prerogatives to the workers:
The change process was introduced because management saw apartheid is dying and
competition will grow. They realised that if they are not up to standard they will
lose the market. It is not because they care about the workers. (Worker No. 26,
Nampak Polyfoil)
Tables 2 and 3 below look at responses to questions about the impact of the change
processes on conditions and practices on the shopfloor. The significance of these results,
however, is that they serve as an explanation of why the workers withdrew their support by
boycotting the processes. Thus the results in these tables give an indication of the
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yardsticks by which the workers measured the benefits, or lack thereof, of the change
processes.
Table 2: Worker Attitudes to Management-initiated Participation:
"Since the introduction of worker participation . . . "
1. "The attitude of management towards workers has improved?"
Factory (sample) Agree <%) Not Sure (%) Disagree
PG Bison (41) 10 - 90
NPPolyfoiI(31) 52 - 48
2. "Workers are treated better?"
PG Bison (41) 12 - 88
NPPolyfoil(31) 61 - 39
3. "I now enjoy my job and can take decisions on how to do it better?"
PG Bison (41) 7 2 90
NPPolyfoil(31) 48 - 52
4. "Working conditions have improved"
PG Bison (41) 10 2 88
NPPolyfoil(31) 42 - 58
5. "Wages have improved"
PG Bison (41) - 2 98
NPPolyfoil(31) 6.5 3 90
6. "Workers have more say in running the factory"
PG Bison (41) - 2 98
NPPolyfoil(31) 29 6.5 64.5
7. "Management talks nicely but no action is taken to improve conditions"
PG Bison (41) 95 - 5
NPPolyfoil(31) 81 - 19
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Table 3 looks at shop stewards and the role that they played. It is significant to note the
difference in responses between the two factories in this table. This seems to indicate the
degree to which the shop stewards had become alienated from their membership. In other
words, the results show a greater degree of democratic rapture, weakness and
disorganisation at PG Bison compared to Nampak Polyfoil.
Table 3: Did Management Initiated Participation Affect Your Shop Stewards?:
"Did worker participation make shop stewards More, or Less- accountable to workers ?"
Factory More Less Not Sure Did Not
(sample) £ ® iM ffil Affect
PG Bison (41) 5 71 12 12
NP Polyfoil (31) 23 16 10 50
It will be noted from both Table 2 and Table 3 that the degree of disenchantment at PG
Bison was much higher than at Nampak Polyfoil. This is probably explained by the fact
that at PG Bison the process had had a longer life span and the workers had given it a
longer chance to prove itself, whereas at Polyfoil the process was boycotted even before
some aspects of it could be implemented and be subjected to scrutiny. What seems to have
influenced the decision of the Nampak Polyfoil workers was failure of management to
make an unequivocal commitment to worker participation, and the intervention by
influential shop stewards who argued that the process would never deliver results because
management was not committed to change. These shop stewards also pointed out to
workers that the change process was weakening the union and that shop stewards were no
longer performing their duties effectively. However, the results also show that even though
the debate was won by the majority faction led by these shop stewards, there were still
some workers who either believed that through power they could wring out some
concessions from management or who saw opportunities for themselves in the change
process.5
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The suspension of the processes came after workers had made an assessment of the costs
and benefits to themselves as individuals and as a collective. While most workers and shop
stewards complained that most of the issues agreed in discussions with management were
not implemented, they felt that even those aspects that were implemented by management
were introduced in a way that brought little, if any, benefit to the workers. At PG Bison
the only aspects of TPQ which were implemented were the incentive bonus, the in-a-groups
(teams) and adult literacy classes. In February 1994 the adult literacy classes were the only
aspect of TPQ which remained. A shop steward at PG Bison believes that the in-a-groups
failed because management used the wrong approach in implementing them:
(T)hey introduced the in-a-groups, but mainly at the top level, at management level.
But they failed to introduce the groups among the workers. Instead they introduced
multi-skilling. (Qoqozulu Mngomezulu, shop steward, PG Bison)
The groups were supposed to be semi-autonomous work groups which allowed workers
greater freedom and power to discuss and take decisions about their own jobs so that they
could do them better. Instead, they were seen by many workers to be another management
structure whose job was to convey further instructions to the shop floor. So they were
rejected by the workers. Thus any hopes by workers that TPQ would allow them more say
in decision-making were dashed and the ubiquitous foremen and supervisors continued to
rule supreme on the shop floor. When the process was introduced supervisors and foremen
felt threatened by the prospect of workers assuming greater responsibility for their own
jobs. According to shop stewards supervisors and foremen kept reminding workers that
"TPQ is at the training centre (where the value-sharing sessions were held), and not in the
plant".6 At Nampak Polyfoil first line managers also became apprehensive, fearing for their
jobs in the event of more decision-making powers being delegated to workers in their work
stations. Managing director, Mr de Jongh referred to these fears during an interview.
I would not be surprised if there is a manager or two, or a supervisor who wants to
sabotage the process. They would also like to sabotage it because they are seeing it
as a threat. (Loutjie de Jongh, managing director, Nampak Polyfoil)
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For supervisors and foremen at PG Bison, one way of sabotaging TPQ was to cling to their
powers to decide and direct the activities of the workers on the shopfloor. As one shop
steward explained,
Here you are not able to take decisions regarding your own work and you have no
role in higher decisions....They have blocked all opportunities for workers to
become involved in decision-making. The supervisors are keeping some of those
job-related powers for themselves. (Simon Dlamini, shop steward, PG Bison)
The 'multi-skilling' that management introduced was, in fact, multi-tasking, a practice
which became very unpopular among workers and which was to lead to the demise of TPQ
at the factory. A shop steward explained how 'multi-skilling' worked,
Some of the things that were happening were unacceptable to the workers.
Management introduced new rules without consultation. Like they introduced multi-
skilling and many other things. Multi-skilling caused many problems for workers.
For example, they would take a job that was done by four people and give it to two
people. Then they would take the other two to another department. So you would
find that two workers were doing the job of four workers. When management
introduced this multi-skilling the manager told us that the remaining two workers
would share the wages of the two other workers. But as time went on it became
clear that nothing was going to happen. So it created serious problems for the
workers and that is when the workers started complaining about TPQ. (Simon
Dlamini, shop steward, PG Bison)
As far as the incentive bonus is concerned many workers said they had never received it.
Those who had received it at some stage said management had stopped it because they
claimed production was low.
Since the suspension of Nampak Polyfoil's change process management has tried to revive
it by introducing a production bonus and 'natural working teams'. It is difficult to assess
these because at the time of the study both had just been introduced. But many workers and
shop stewards expressed the view that they would support team-working provided the
positions of supervisors and team leaders 7 were phased out and their powers delegated to
the teams. The teams would then elect team leaders or co-ordinators from within their
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ranks who would have a fixed term of office. With regard to the incentive bonus many
workers did not even know about it. Those who did felt that the conditions set for getting
the bonus were too strict and that this would make it impossible for most workers to get it.
Others felt the workers did not have the power or access to information for them to be able
to verify whether or not they were meeting the production targets which entitle them to
receive the bonus.
However, the general problem at Poly foil was that workers and shop stewards felt
management was not acting in good faith. The first phase of the change process was the
discussion of values which would serve as guidelines for acceptable conduct and practice
by all in the company. These discussions deadlocked, particularly on the question of
participation by workers, and so the values could not be finalised. Workers then withdrew
their support for the process. But management later tried to introduced 'natural working
teams' without consulting the workers.
Instead of addressing those values, management came up with a new system of
natural working teams which they had discussed and finalised. So what they
expected from us was to just accept the new system and implement it. So at the
moment we are still waiting for them to implement this system because it is their
system. (Sydwelt Qomoyi, shop steward, Nampak Polyfoil)
The workers' criticisms of the change processes point to a major weakness of the processes
at PG Bison and Nampak Polyfoil, namely, that, at best, the changes were half-hearted and
cosmetic. Management was not prepared to concede any more control of the labour
process than that which the workers had wrestled from them through struggle. Their
objective was to restructure and reinforce the managerial prerogative in a situation where
their credibility was at an all-time low. This is illustrated by management practices and
statements on three issues - work teams, participation and the flattening of hierarchies of
control. While PG Bison workers believed that the in-a-groups (work teams) should
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provide an opportunity for workers to "have a say in planning their tasks"8, engineering
department manager, D. Ferreira argued for a different role for the in-a-groups:
In-a-groups should be the channel to communicate to workers, to transmit
information. For example, a manager using them to tell people to wear earmuffs.
We must do like the Japanese do. But you can't get things working immediately.
We couldn't immediately delegate authority because workers do not have the
information and decision-making background. Management has got the information.
(D. Ferreira, engineering departmental manager, PG Bison)
This statement was simultaneously an argument in favour of maintaining the existing
hierarchies of control and other Taylorist practices. In short, it was an argument in favour
of the separation between conception and execution, which flies in the face of the group's
commitment to a participatory style of management. Furthermore, it would seem that
Ferreira was echoing the sentiments of many his colleagues in management. Where these
groups were established they were used for precisely the same purpose that he had in mind.
A shop steward gave an account of his experience of an in-a-group.
They (in-a-groups) were not in all departments, but they were there in a number of
departments. It happened by the MD, Andries Vorster, calling you, "so and so,
come to my office quickly". When you get there he would dictate and dictate and
tell you, "this and that I don't like". That would be an in-a-group. For example, he
would call Zeph, myself (at the time not being a shop steward), Nqaba and
Mathebula. They would call us 'seniors' among the black workers. He would then
tell us, "this and that I do not want to see". (Andries Fakude, shop steward, PG
Bison)
Nampak Polyfoil's managing director, Mr de Jongh, also argued for a clear separation
between conception and execution, pointing out that "management has got a job to do and
the workers have got a job to do". He went to argue that,
I haven't been to university for eight years for nothing. I have gone there to be
equipped to have the ability to make certain decisions....I don't believe that it is
worth the energy to discuss things with people that do not understand the
implications and that do not have a direct contribution to make towards getting to a
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positive outcome or a specific outcome....To ask other people where to spend the
money in terms of greater output other than extruder or something like that, I don't
think that they have the ability to make that decision. And I don't know what the
good is of asking the people anyway. {Loutjie de Jongh, managing director,
Nampak Potyfoif)
At both factories these were the problems and contradictory statements which convinced
workers that management was not ready to embark on meaningful change. It was in the
process of criticising management-initiated participatory processes that workers began to
develop their own notions of workplace democratisation. What follows below is a
discussion of those notions of democratisation and their potential to become the foundation
of a new union vision for workplace democratisation.
'We Need a Democratic Management Team'
Another notable finding of the research is that workers hold moderate views on industrial
democracy which are similar to those held by what Clegg calls the 'reformist industrial
democrats1 who maintain that industrial democracy can be achieved by worker participation
in management without changing the ownership of the means of production. (1960: 132)
Workers were given three statements and were asked to indicate if they 'agree', 'not sure'
or 'disagree' with each statement.
Table 4: Who Should Make Decisions in the Workplace?:
1. "Management in our company knows best and should make all company decisions"
Factory (sample) Agree (%) Not Sure (%) Disagree (%>
PG Bison (41) 2.4 -- 96.6
NPPolyfoil(31) 6.5 -- 93.5
2. "Workers have contributed to building the company and should therefore run it jointly
with management"
PG Bison (41) 100
NPPolyfoil(31) 100
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3. "There is no need for management. Workers can and should run the company
themselves"
PG Bison (41) 7.3 - 92.7
NP Polyfoil (31) 25.8 -- 74.2
The responses show that most workers reject the notion that 'management knows all and
should therefore take all decisions'. 9 But what is more significant is that most workers in
both factories rejected the notion of workers running the factory on their own and, instead
showed a strong preference for joint control and management. As one PG Bison worker put
it,
We need management. Workers cannot run the factory alone. The only problem is
that the present management is unjust. There must be someone in charge. We need
a democratic management team. {Worker No. 35, PG Bison)
These results also seem to stand in stark contrast to present COSATU policy and the
rhetoric of some unionists, particularly during the 1980s, which called for worker control
of production in a socialist system. It is not clear whether these results indicate a shift by
workers away from socialism or whether this has always been the view of rank and file
union members. But what can be said at this stage is that the result are consistent with
workers' past experience and union practice of making winnable demands which achieve
incremental gains thus enabling workers to push back the frontier of control. If it is indeed
the case that workers view the struggle for industrial democracy, and trade union struggles
in general, as being the art of the possible, then these results do not necessarily negate
COSATU's goal of destroying capitalism and ushering in a socialist system. But they do
reflect a more pragmatic approach to workplace democratisation.
Discussions with shop stewards throw some light on how the workers would like to be
involved in decision-making. They believe that the workers have a lot to contribute towards
the success of the company. A PG Bison shop steward feels that management are not
making use of workers' ideas,
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Management should not just assume that because workers are on the factory floor
they have nothing to contribute. I think that is very important for the success of a
process like this. Workers should be given powers to do certain things or to
implement certain decisions themselves, or they should be allowed to have a say in
decision-making. (Simon Dlamini, shop steward, PB Gison)
This desire to participate is expressed in relation to two levels of the factory, namely, on
the shop floor around the jobs that workers do, and at the level of the factory as an
economic entity. The demand for participation on the shop floor is often made because
workers believe they know their jobs well enough to take the right decisions and to ensure
that the production process runs smoothly. Workers were very unhappy with the
irrationalities of the current system of decision-making on the shop floor and resented the
powers that supervisors and team leaders wielded. There was a view that team-working
(whether in natural working teams or in-a-groups) would allow workers to be more
creative, responsible and efficient. Workers and shop stewards argued that this autonomy
in the labour process would create ideal conditions for them to apply their tacit skills,
knowledge and experience accumulated informally through continuous involvement in the
labour process, to improve efficiency and productivity. A shop steward put it cogently in
her observation that,
If we work in teams you know where you work, what you must do in your team.
You don't have to go around and ask the supervisor, 'now it is like this, what must
I do?'. You talk to your team, you discuss your problem, you discuss about the
work. That is the way I understand it. {Irene Lazarus, shop steward, Nampak
Polyfoit)
Workers at PG Bison had a similar view. This sentiment was expressed in a group
discussion with shop stewards about the role of the in-a-groups.
Workers thought the in-a-groups would plan their work. But the groups were used
to instruct workers, not to allow them a say in planning their tasks. (Group
interview with PG Bison shop stewards)
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In both cases management desperately wanted to access the tacit skills of workers and this
was the motivation for setting up the work teams. But they did not want to create what
workers believed to be the necessary for conditions accessing those skills, namely, the
dismantling of the primary structures of managerial control, in the form of team leaders,
supervisors and foremen, and the delegation of powers previously vested in these structures
to the workers themselves. As one Nampak Polyfoil shop steward put it,
The people should control themselves so that they can be efficient, because now
these supervisors and the team leaders are oppressing the people and they are doing
nothing at the end of the day. When they knock off here they are having more
money than what I got, and I'm doing the whole job. In terms of quality and proper
bags that should be packed, the operator is responsible for that job. If that job can
be rejected by the customer the operator suffers at the end of the day. And now
where does the quality start? It starts from extrusion, goes to the quality controllers
for check up and is then sent to bagging. Now all that chain is not being considered.
Also, within that chain there is a quality manager. But now the poor operator must
come and suffer at the end of the day, sit here with a final written warning, a
written warning, at the end of the day loses the job. (Beljium Makhabane, shop
steward, Nampak Polyfoil)
As the above statement makes clear, the demand for more participation by workers around
their jobs, whether through teams or as individuals, is linked to another, namely, that
management hierarchies be flattened. At PG Bison workers believed that a start could be
made by doing away with supervisors and foremen while at Polyfoil workers wanted to do
away with team leaders and supervisors. In both cases team leaders, supervisors and
foremen were said to be the ones most vehemently opposed to change on the shop floor.
However, while getting rid of team leaders, supervisors and foremen was seen as a solution
by some workers, there were those who argued that it does not solve the problem at all.
Let me tell you something that is so easy. You can say, 'yes, let's get rid of these
two people, the supervisor and the team leader'. There will be one person who is
going to be involved because if they still impose instructions to the people, that is
not going to stop when they take the supervisor and the team leader. It will remain
the same. Someone else will take over that job. So now the right thing that we think
22
is going to solve the problem is to have representatives in those [management]
structures. (Sydwell Qomoyi, shop steward, Nampak Poly foil)
Thus for some workers the demand to participate on the shopfloor was linked to one for
participation at higher levels of decision-making. In both cases the processes which
management introduced did not provide for participation in company-wide decision-
making. This is not to suggest that TPQ and the change process had a clear strategy of
participation on the shopfloor either. However, both processes did provide for some form
of pseudo participation on the shopfloor because, as argued above, management needed to
win the consent and co-operation of the workforce in the labour process. A Nampak
Polyfoil shop steward summarized the rationale for workers wanting to participate in
factory/company level decision-making:
We wanted to be represented in the decision-making structures of the company,
from the general manager's structure down to the team leaders' structure on the
shop floor. Our view was that whenever Mr de Jongh [general manager] is going to
do anything in the company there must be a committee of worker representatives
that he consults with. We did not want things to come down to us as matters that
have already been decided upon, coming to us via certain people, namely from the
general manager to the operations manager who will then take it to the middle
mangers, then the middle managers taking it to the supervisors, then supervisors
taking it down to us as instructions saying, 'we are doing this'....We wanted
somebody who would be there and, if there was a need to table a proposal from the
workers, that person would be able to table those proposals as part of the decision-
making process. The purpose of such representation would be to ensure that the
views of the workers are taken account of when decisions are being made. (Sydwell
Qomoyi, shop steward, Nampak Polyfoil)
This desire to participate derives from worker's experience of democracy in a trade union,
a hybrid of participatory and representative democracy where rank and file workers have
representation in all decision-making structures and where those at the top do not impose
decisions from the top down. This particular demand indicates that management has a
credibility crisis as workers feel they cannot trust management to take the right and just
decisions to accommodate all interests within the company. As Table 4 above suggests,
workers are not demanding participation because they are waging an ideological battle to
bring down the system of capitalism in order to replace it with some kind of Utopian system
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of workers' control of the means of production. In response to another question which
asked workers to list three things that would have to be done to make their factory
democratic, the majority of workers at both factories put joint decision-making on top of
the list. This was followed by such other demands as full disclosure of all information,
promotion opportunities for blacks, education and training opportunities, an end to racial
discrimination and favouritism, better wages, housing subsidies, equal pay for equal work
and team working to replace team leaders and supervisors.10
As stated earlier the national union played no role in assisting the workers and the shop
stewards to develop a response to the new strategies of management. The only union
intervention some shop stewards could recall was a discussion paper written by PPWAWU
unionists, Welcome Ntshangase and Apolis Solomons, which identified three options for
the union: stand back and let it happen, obstruct the process or become centrally
involved.11 For most shop stewards the paper was useful only insofar as it identified and
discussed the options. Beyond that they felt the union was not giving any guidance in
defining the content of a response to the initiatives of management. A Nampak Poly foil
shop steward complained that most of their full-time union officials did not have enough
skills to help workers respond to the change process.
(S)ometimes it brings us to the same level. You find that we are on the same level
of understanding, and no one is in a position to give any advice. You find
management doing whatever they want. (ThembaTiya, shop steward, Nampak
Polyfoil)
Notwithstanding this and other weaknesses facing the union, workers on the shop floor are
in the process of developing a framework which could become the foundation of their
vision of industrial democracy. The results of the workers' survey as well as interviews
with shop stewards would seem to suggest that from the perspective of union members and
shopfloor leadership, shopfloor democratisation cannot be divorced from the struggles they
have been fighting over the years. From this point of view democratisation is about making
gains on bread and butter issues and conditions of employment, removing discriminatory
practices and winning more autonomy and control in the labour process and at higher levels
company decision-making. Thus the key elements of this emerging framework are:
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a) Workers' involvement in decision-making at all levels. (In some instances this
may involve the flattening management hierarchies, particularly on the shop floor.
It also entails developing, jointly with the workers, better systems of consultation
and communication).
b) Full disclosure of all information.
c) Better opportunities for all workers. (This includes education, training,
promotions).
d) Fair rewards and incentive schemes. (Including wages and bonuses).
e) Fair and equal treatment for all. (No racial discrimination, efforts to improve the
living standards of workers as well as their physical working conditions, fair
grading systems, no favouritism, no victimisation).
It will be noted from the above that workers do not separate their demand for
democratisation from bread and butter demands. Consequently, in their view the struggle
for workplace democratisation is not separate from their current struggles. It is about
expanding their influence on the shopfloor and contesting the power of management to
make unilateral decisions. In addition, the union is seen as one of the many forms of
democratic expression for workers in a democratic workplace. Conceived of in this way,
workplace democratisation ceases to be an Utopian idea or blueprint and becomes a political
strategy in the struggle to increase the influence of workers over the labour process, be it
capitalist or socialist. This is what is distinctive about the workers' notion of workplace
democracy. Their organic vision of democratisation takes as its point of departure the
social relations of production and seeks to address the concerns of the workers on the
shopfloor. The debate among the workers is far from over. For some inside and outside of
the labour movement it is always tempting to take either what Cressey and Maclnnes
(1980) call the 'incorporationist' approach or the 'advance of labour approach'. (1980: 6)
But to understand the real challenge of democratisation means we have to understand what
Cressey and Maclnnes term the 'material space for struggle at the point of production'
which 'cuts both ways'. (1980: 20)
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If we escape from the notion of a working class which prior to the historical break
is merely an 'aspect of capital' but exists politically as a universal force opposed to
it, and open up the possibility for a 'practical and prefigurative socialist polities',
then it must also be remembered that such a struggle roots itself initially in the
workplace rather than in the class struggle as a whole. Just as such struggles are not
artificial and 'incorporated', neither are they necessarily 'spontaneously' socialist.
They may take either form, and the task before us is surely thus to develop
yardsticks for differentiating the two and promoting the latter. (Cressey and
Maclnnes, 1980: 20)
'I Will Only Leave the Union When I Die1
Whether or not the union is equal to the 'task' identified by Cressey and Maclnnes is a
matter that is beyond the scope of this paper. It has been shown above that the union has
not intervened in any serious way on the shop floor regarding worker participation. But
this did not seem to have affected the support the union commands among the workers. In
fact, according to the workers' vision, workplace democracy is not seen as an alternative to
the union. On the contrary, the union is seen as an integral part of the democratic struggle
on the shopfloor. Part of the explanation for this is the fact that their notion of the union is
one which included themselves as members and shop stewards as their elected
representatives who deal with their day-to-day concerns on the shopfloor. Union members
noted that the introduction of the change processes by management had not made union
membership irrelevant. All of them expressed a strong view that union was their strongest
defence against management. They have seen many improvements brought by the union
over the years. As one worker explained,
We cannot do without the union. I will only leave the union when I die. Even when
we have a new government we will still need a union. We will always need a union.
It is our only hope. Before we were getting dismissed every day. Now the union has
stopped that. {Worker No. 16, Nampak Polyfoil)
There are a number of factors that explain the level of support the union enjoys among its
members and workers are influenced by some, or all these factors:
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Firstly, the union has won real gains for the workers in terms of wages, physical working
conditions, treatment by managers/foremen/supervisors, building solidarity among the
workers and winning other conditions of work like shorter hours of work, shift allowances,
etc. The union has also managed to reduce or stop some unfair practices like unfair
dismissals, etc.
Secondly, the union is seen by the majority of workers to be operating democratically. The
majority of workers (95 percent at Nampak and 84 percent at PG Bison) said that the union
(shop stewards and union organisers) always call a meeting to get a mandate before
negotiations with management. They further observed that all demands by management
must first be approved by the workers and that there are always report-back meetings after
each session of the negitiation process. Additionally, 97 percent of Nampak Poly foil
workers and 94 percent of PG Bison workers said the union always came back for a fresh
mandate when there was a deadlock in negotiations.
In response to the question, "Do you feel that your shop stewards are always working
according to the wishes of the workers when representing the workforce to management
and the union?', workers in both factories gave the shop stewards and the union a strong
vote of confidence (100% at PG Bison and 94 percent at Poly foil answered 'yes' to this
question). Even in cases where some workers said shop steward had acted without a
mandate, they indicated that steps had been taken by workers against those shop stewards.12
Thirdly, all the workers had easy access to the union through their departmental shop
stewards. Most workers in both factories (85 percent at PG Bison and 81 percent at
Nampak Polyfoil) said they met and could consult their shop steward daily.
All the above constitute the model of democracy that unionised workers are used to, and
they support it because it cares about the workers, it is accessible to all, it is fair and
transparent, and the workers can exercise real control over it. One of the central
arguments of this paper therefore is that organised workers' notion of industrial democracy
or worker participation is founded on their experience of democratic practice in their
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union. Their expectation is that industrial democracy should come close to or match that
model of democracy just as they expect democracy in other spheres of society to do the
same.13
Some may argue that this is a limited notion of industrial democracy, that it does not
challenge the ownership of the means of production by one class, and that it is impossible
to achieve democratic control in capitalist production. On the other hand, there may be
those who argue that worker participation as introduced by management provides all the
answers to workers' problems on the shop floor and therefore accept these schemes
uncritically. Both arguments fail to understand the challenge posed by workers' struggles
on the shop floor. What seems to be emerging from workers on the shop floor as they
continue debating and engaging with management's schemes of worker participation is a
phase of struggle by the workers whose emphasis is on what Goodrich (1920) calls "the
demand to take a hand in the controlling. ...the desire for a share in the job of running
things". (1920: 37) The challenge for PPWAWU and indeed, the entire trade union
movement, as it enters a new era of democracy, is to begin to harness these and other
experiences and workers' notions of democracy in the workplace and use them as a
foundation for a new vision of workplace democratisation.
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Endnotes:
1. Research for this paper was undertaken as part of an MA thesis which has since
been completed. (Buhlungu, 1996)
2. PPWAWU came into being as a result of a merger of the Paper, Wood and Allied
Workers' Union (PWAWU) and another smaller printing union in 1987. PWAWU had
been formed in the early 1970s and was one of the founder unions of FOSATU in
1979. In 1985 it joined other independent unions to form the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU).
3. The strong perception that management's initiatives were aimed to undermine or had
the effect of undermining the union, particularly elected worker leadership, also came
out during interviews with shop stewards in both factories. This fear has been
expressed by workers and shop stewards in other factories organised by other unions.
von Holdt's (1993) research in a number of Natal factories, including Dunlop, Frame,
Unilever, Alusaf and Coronation, found that "Shop stewards were suspicious or
skeptical of these schemes, seeing them as dominated by management and designed to
undermine the union". (vonHoldt, K. (1993) "The Challenge of Participation", SALB,
17,3, p. 49). Similarly, Barret found 'cynicism' among Premier shop stewards because
of a perception that management's participation programme was 'watering down1 the
militancy of the shop stewards and workers. (Barret, J. (1993) "Participation at
Premier", SALB, 17,2, pp. 66 - 7).
4. Interview with Sipho Kubheka, former PPWAWU general secretary, 28 November
1994.
5. However, this was going to change later as the full implications of the change process
became clearer to most workers. In 1994 a team of researchers from the Sociology of
Work Unit (SWOP) and PPWAWU visited the factory to asses the impact of a group
strategy called 'world class manufacturing'. Sixty workers had just been retrenched as a
result of a restructuring exercise which involved rationalisation of production and the
introduction of new technology. The team found a much greater degree of opposition the
change process. For details see, SWOP/PPWAWU (1994) Restructuring at Nampak: A
Strategy for Worker Involvement.
6. Group interview with shop stewards, PG Bison, July 1993.
7. Only Nampak Polyfoil has the position of team leader. Team leaders' are the lowest
rung of the management hierarchy and are appointed by middle management to
oversee the rest of the workforce. Despite the name, 'team leaders' precede the
introduction of natural working teams by many years. They are very unpopular with
most workers and the workforce now feel management is trying to impose them on
the newly established teams.
8. Group interview with PG Bison shop stewards, Piet Retief, July 1993.
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9. A rather surprising exception was one worker who agreed with the first statement in the
table and went on to explain, "I do not believe that a company should be run
democratically. It should be run by the person or people who have put down the capital."
(Worker No. 24, PG Bison, Piet Retief)
10. The labour relations dispensation envisaged in the new Labour Relations Act creates
opportunities which workers could exploit to make some gains on some of these issues.
For example, Chapter V of this new law provides for forms of joint decision-making
through structures called workplace forums. The forums also have powers to decide
jointly with management on issues such as developing non-discrimination policies and
affirmative action. Finally, the law also puts an obligation on management to disclose
information to workers. See Labour Relations Act, No.66, 1995.
11. This discussion document, (Ntshangase, W. And Solomons, A. (1993)), was produced
by the two PPWAWU officials after a two months research fellowship at the
Sociology of Work Unit (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand. It argued for
engagement with management participation strategies in a way which would not
undermine the union and its collective bargaining structures. As a result it came out in
favour of what it termed "adversarial participation", namely, participation through
normal collective bargaining structures. Many workers and shop stewards felt the
document did not give them concrete and practical suggestions for engaging with
management.
12. The case of PG Bison illustrates this point. In one year a committee of shop stewards
committee was perceived to be selling out to management. When their term of office
expired they were not re-elected.
13. A recent study on workers expectations of parliamentary democracy also draws the
conclusion that workers tend to transfer their understanding of union democracy to
politics. They understand concepts like mandates and accountability in parliamentary
politics in the same way that those concepts operate in union democracy (Ginsburg, D.,
Webster, E., et al (1995)).
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